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THE NUMBERS GAME - THE USE AND MISUSE
OF STATISTICS IN CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
MARCY
I.

M. HALLOCKt

INTRODUCTION

"In the problem of racial discrimination, statistics often tell
much, and Courts listen."'
"We believe it evident that if the statistics in the instant
matter represent less than a shout, they certainly constitute
'2
far more than a mere whisper."

T

HE PARTIES TO ACTIONS BROUGHT UNDER THE CIVIL
RIGHTS LAWS 3 have relied increasingly upon statistical
4
analyses to establish or rebut cases of unlawful discrimination.
Although statistical evidence has been considered significant in
actions brought to redress racial discrimination in jury selection,5 it
has been used most frequently in cases of allegedly discriminatory

t B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1972; J.D., Georgetown University Law
Center, 1975. Member, District of Columbia Bar. The author wishes to dedicate this
article to Dr. Stanley Miller.
1. Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir.) (footnote omitted), aff'd
per curiam, 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
2. Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 444 F.2d 687, 689 (5th Cir. 1971).
3. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1970 & Supp. V 1975); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970); Id. § 1983; Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Section 703(a)(1) of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (Title VII), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2(a)(1)(1970), provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin ....
Id. This article focuses on actions brought under Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), to demonstrate the importance of statistical
proof in employment discrimination cases. However, the discussion of statistical
analyses presented herein is also applicable to actions brought under other civil rights
statutes. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970); Id. § 1983.
4. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736 (1977);
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
5. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 486-88 (1977); Turner v. Fouche,
396 U.S. 346, 349-52 (1970); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 327-28 (1970);
Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 205
(1965); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 403-04 (1942); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590
(1930); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 582-87 (10th Cir. 1976). See generally J.
VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES (1977).
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employment practices brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended (Title VII).6
To prove a Title VII violation, the challenged employment
practice must be demonstrated to be discriminatory on the basis of
race, sex, religion, or national origin. 7 Unlike discrimination suits
8
under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution,
it is not necessary in Title VII actions to prove that an employer
subjectively intended to discriminate. 9 Statistical evidence of a
discriminatory impact has been held by some courts to be sufficient
to establish a prima facie violation of Title VII. 1° According to one
court, "[i]n many cases the only available avenue of proof is the use
of racial statistics to uncover clandestine and covert discrimination
by the employer or union involved."'" Another court concluded that
6. 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See, e.g., Pettway v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 225 n.34 (5th Cir. 1974); Brown v. Gaston
County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1382 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 442 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir. 1971); Parham v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431
F.2d 245, 247 (10th Cir. 1970). For discussions of the use of statistics to prove cases of
employment discrimination, see Fiss, Theory of FairEmployment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L.
REV. 235, 268-81 (1971); Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment
Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Statistical Proof and Rebuttal]; Note, Employment Discrimination: Statistics and Preferences Under Title VII, 59 VA.L. REV. 463 (1973) (hereinafter
cited as Statistics and Preferences].
7. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S.Ct. 2736 (1977); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 429 (1971).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976).
9. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). See also Statistics and
Preferences, supra note 6, at 465.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 120 (5th Cir. 1972).
In Hayes, the government charged that the employer's hiring practices violated Title
VII by excluding blacks from technical and clerical jobs. Id. at 119. Statistical
evidence was introduced to show that only 20 of the 1223 employees in these positions
were Negroes, while 30% of the general population of the surrounding area consisted
of Negroes. Id. at 120. In determining that these figures were relevant to establishing
a Title VII violation, the Fifth Circuit stated that "these lopsided ratios are not
conclusive proof of past or present discriminatory hiring practices; however, they do
represent a primafacie case." Id. (emphasis in original). The court noted that the high
ratio of whites to blacks in clerical and technical jobs justified an inference of racially
discriminatory hiring procedures. Id. See also United States v. Ironworkers Local 86,
443 F.2d 544, 551 & n.21 (9th Cir. 1971). But see Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
433 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970) (statistics, as a matter of law, established a violation
of Title VII).
11. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir. 1971). In
Ironworkers, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that five building
construction unions and three joint apprenticeship and training committees were
guilty of racially discriminatory conduct which deprived blacks of employment
opportunities. Id. at 546. The evidence revealed the underrepresentation of blacks in
the unions and committees, as well as many overt acts of unlawful discrimination. Id.
at 548.
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"[s]tatistical evidence is an important tool for placing seemingly
12
inoffensive employment practices in their proper perspective."

Courts have formulated general guidelines for meeting the
burden of proof in Title VII cases, 13 despite the diversity of

14
employment practices which have been litigated under the statute.
To establish a prima facie case, in the absence of an exculpatory
explanation from the defendant-employer, the plaintiff-employee
must present evidence of disparate treatment sufficient to support an
inference of unlawful discrimination. 15 For example, to establish a

12. Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 527 (6th Cir. 1976). In Senter,
the Sixth Circuit found that the gross statistical disparity between the percentage of
blacks employed at hourly and supervisory positions helped to establish that the
employer's promotional system violated Title VII. Id. at 527-28. The court reasoned
that "[a]n employee is at an inherent disadvantage in gathering hard evidence of
employment discrimination, particularly when the discrimination is plant-wide in
scope. It is for this reason that we generally acknowledge the value of statistical
evidence in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII." Id. at
527 (citations omitted).
13. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977). In that case, the government claimed that the company was guilty of a
"pattern or practice" of discrimination in violation of Title VII. Id. at 328-29
(construing Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 707, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1970)).
The Court stated:
Because it alleged a systemwide pattern or practice of resistance to the full
enjoyment of Title VII rights, the Government ultimately had to prove more than
the mere occurrence of isolated or "accidental" or sporadic discriminatory acts. It
had to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that racial discrimination
was the company's standard operating procedure - the regular rather than the
unusual practice.
431 U.S. at 336. (footnote omitted).
14. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
329-30 (1977) (hiring, assignment, pay, promotion, transfer, and seniority practices);
Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 515 (6th Cir. 1976) (promotion system);
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 216 (5th Cir. 1974) (employees'
governing boards, testing and employment qualifications, apprenticeship program,
assignment to supervisory positions, and seniority system); Brown v. Gaston County
Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1383 (4th Cir. 1972) (hiring and promotion practices,
and failure to post notices of job vacancies); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456
F.2d 112, 119 (5th Cir. 1972) (relying on employment referral service for job applicants
and maintaining different application procedure for friends and relatives of
employees); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 548 (9th Cir. 1971)
(admission requirements, applicant testing, active recruitment of white applicants,
and preferential treatment for friends and relatives of employees or union members).
15. Ochoa v. Monsanto Co., 335 F. Supp. 53, 58 (S.D. Tex. 1971). In the words of
the Ochoa court:
At most, the demonstration of gross statistical disparity amounts to a
prima facie showing of discrimination, thus shifting to the opposing party the
burden of going forward, with exculpatory evidence .... Under Title VII, such
data has been viewed in this Circuit as establishing a "preliminary showing" of
a violation .... This is taken to mean that plaintiff, although still bearing the
risk of nonpersuasion, can by the use of persuasive statistics cast upon
defendant the duty of producing at least equally persuasive controverting
evidence if he can.
Id. at 58 (citations omitted).
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prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII, the
Supreme Court has held that the plaintiff must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and
the employer continued to 16seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications.
In an effort to rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case, the
defendant-employer may offer a business reason for the challenged
practice. 17 However, the inference of illegality will be dispelled only
if the evidence proves that the business purpose is legitmate and
8
nondiscriminatory.
Although statistics may be considered probative and supportive
of an individual Title VII claim, they have been held to be
2°
"determinative" in class actions. 19 The magnitude of class actions,
16. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (footnote omitted).
Subsequent cases have held that the plaintiff-employee need not have applied for
employment if the employer's conduct indicates that plaintiffs application would
have been futile. See, eg., Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight System Inc., 505 F.2d
40, 55 (5th Cir. 1974), reuv'd in part on other grounds, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
17. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Bing v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 444 F.2d 687, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1971).
18. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see United States
v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 364-66 (8th Cir. 1973); Bing v. Roadway Express,
Inc., 444 F.2d 687, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791,
798-800 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). See generally B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 45-48 (1976).
In Bing, the employer's no-transfer rule, whereby job transfers between city
drivers and road drivers were restricted and penalized, was challenged as a violation
of Title VII. 444 F.2d at 688. A discriminatory hiring practice was demonstrated by
the evidence that "[aIll road drivers are, and always have been, white; all Negro
drivers are city drivers, though not all city drivers are Negro." Id. The plaintiffemployee alleged that the no-transfer rule perpetuated the discriminatory effect of the
employer's past hiring practices. Id. The employer advanced three reasons to justify
the rule as a valid business necessity: "1) [t]ransfers necessitate additional training
costs ...; 2) road driving requires different skills than city driving; and 3) transfers
cause labor problems because the job categories in question are covered by different
union contracts." Id. at 690. The Fifth Circuit rejected the first justification by noting
that the cost of training a new employee, who is not familiar with policy and
procedure, would be greater than the expense of training a transferee. Id. The second
reason advanced in support of the no-transfer rule was not considered compelling
since the court determined that the qualifications of both transferees and new
employees could be ascertained through similar screening procedures. Id. at 691. In
concluding that any change in an employment status quo could create labor problems,
the court also found the final justification for the rule to be insufficient. Id. Therefore,
the business reasons advanced by the employer could not be used to rebut the prima
facie case established by the plaintiff-employee. Id.
19. Harper v. Trans World Airline, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 412 (8th Cir. 1975), citing
King v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 523 F.2d 879, 882 (8th Cir. 1975).
20. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). For a discussion of the numerosity requirement of
Rule 23, see Hopper, Propriety of Class Actions Under Title VII and Determinationof
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and the virtual impossibility of comparing each member of the
class,2 1 have forced the courts to allow parties to introduce statistical
data as evidence of employment practices. 22 According to the
Supreme Court, statistical proof of a significant disparity in

treatment can constitute a prima facie case in class actions, and
shift the burden of going forward with evidence to the opposing
23
party.

In ratifying the use of statistical evidence, courts have
recognized that there are certain inherent limitations in its probative
value. 24 The Ninth Circuit has warned: "[A]s is the case with all
statistics, their use is conditioned by the existence of proper
supportive facts and the absence of variables which would
undermine the reasonableness of the inference of discrimination
which is drawn. ' 25 In the recent Supreme Court case of International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 26 the Court reaffirmed
the importance of statistical proof, but cautioned "that statistics are
not irrefutable; they come in infinite variety and, like any other kind
of evidence, they may be rebutted. In short, their usefulness depends
'27
on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.
Appellate courts have articulated guidelines for the use of
statistics in order to minimize the inherent limitations of statistical
proof. In Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,2 8 the Tenth Circuit ruled

that the statistical data must be closely related to the specific issue
for which it is submitted. 29 The Fourth Circuit, in Logan v. General
the Class, in

SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS

1976,

at 209-12 (1976). For a detailed treatment of class actions under Title VII, see B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 18, at 1085-1134.
21. The United States Supreme Court has recently indicated that it may be
lenient in certifying class actions in employment discrimination suits. East Tex.
Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977). In that case, the Court
asserted that "suits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often by their very
nature class suits, involving classwide wrongs. Common questions of law or fact are
typically present. But careful attention to the requirements of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23
remains nonetheless indispensable." Id. at 405.
22. See, e.g., Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721, 723 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 854 (1973); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426 (1970).
23. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772 (1977).
24. E.g., Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 412 (8th Cir. 1975)
(size of sample population represented by statistics too small to have predictive or
persuasive value). See note 107 and accompanying text infra.
25. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir. 1971)
(footnote omitted).
26. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
27. Id. at 340, citing Hester v. Southern Ry., 497 F.2d 1374, 1379-81 (5th Cir.
1974).
28. 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
29. Id. at 272. In Taylor, a discharged employee had brought a class action on
behalf of himself and all other Negro employees of Safeway Stores in Colorado. Id. at
266. The district court, however, limited the size of the class to employees of the store's
Denver warehouse. See id. at 266-67. As a result, Safeway's employment statistics
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Fireproofing Co.,30 refused to infer the existence of discriminatory
hiring practices from a disproportionate representation of minorities
in the employer's work force because there was no finding that

qualified applicants had been refused employment. 3' In the words of
the court, "where such statistics are 'based on community racial
proportions,' which is the situation in this case, they are often
'ambiguous' and 'ought to be listened to with a critical ear.'"32
The United States* Supreme Court echoed these warnings in

Hazelwood School District v. United States3 3 and International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States.34 Although both
decisions noted that gross statistical disparities between a work
force and the general population may constitute prima facie proof of
a Title VII violation, 35 the Court in each case emphasized the
importance of carefully scrutinizing the relevance of the statistical
data offered as evidence. 36 For example, in Hazelwood, the statistics
in the record failed to differentiate between hiring practices before

and after the school district became subject to Title VII. 37 Qualifying
the use of statistical proof, the Supreme Court ruled that "once a

prima facie case has been established by statistical work force
disparities, the employer must be given an opportunity to show 'that
the claimed discriminatory pattern is a product of pre-Act [Title VII]
hiring rather than unlawful post-Act discrimination.' "38

were compared only with the composition of the general population of Denver. See id.
at 272. The Tenth Circuit held that since the class had been redrawn, the district
court's choice of data was proper. Id. For a discussion of Taylor, see notes 82-86 and
accompanying text infra. But see Olson v. Philco-Ford, 531 F.2d 474, 477 (10th Cir.
1976) (statistical evidence of underrepresentation of women in high positions is
irrelevant to allegations of sex discrimination in promotions).
30. 521 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1971).
31. Id. at 884. For a discussion of the statistical examination of qualified workers,
see text accompanying notes 96-114 infra.
32. 521 F.2d at 883, quoting Note, Employment Discriminationand Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1154 (1971).
33. 97 S. Ct. 2736 (1977).
34. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
35. Id. at 339-40 & n.20; 97 S. Ct. at 2741. In Teamsters, the Court explained why
evidence of statistical disparities alone may be sufficient to establish a Title VII
violation:
[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory
hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of
the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from
which employees are hired. Evidence of longlasting and gross disparity between
the composition of a work force and that of the general population thus may be
significant even though § 703(j) makes clear that Title VII imposes no
requirement that a work force mirror the general population.
431 U.S. at 340 n.20.
36. 431 U.S. at 340; 97 S. Ct. at 2744.
37. 97 S. Ct. at 2743.
38. Id., quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
360 (1977).
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Basic problems inherent in statistical analysis still have not
been resolved by the courts, notwithstanding the increased use of
statistics to establish prima facie cases under Title VIP 9 and the
manifold limitations and restrictions on statistical proof that have
been prescribed in the case law.40 This article addresses basic issues
in statistical analyses and suggests various methods of statistical
proof which may be useful in employment discrimination cases.
Section II includes a discussion of statistical significance which
advocates the adoption of the .05 level of significance in Title VII
cases. Section III compares the use of applicant flow and demographic statistical analyses. Multiple regression and chi-square test are
considered in Section IV. Finally, Section V presents a hypothetical
example in which a cell model analysis is utilized to rebut a prima
facie case of discrimination.
II.

THE STATISTICAL CONCEPT OF SIGNIFICANCE

One of the fundamental concepts in the use of statistical
analysis to demonstrate or rebut evidence of employment discrimination cases is that of significance. If the data presented by the
plaintiff shows a "significant" disparity on the basis of race, sex,
religion, national origin, or age, a prima facie case of the violation of
42
Title VI141 or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
is established. The defendant-employer then must justify each
"significant" disparity. 43 Despite its importance, the courts have not
specifically addressed the concept of significance, and have not
established the proper precedent for sophisticated statistical techniques.
In the study of statistics, the term "significance" is used in
connection with the examination of a hypothesis' validity, and its
meaning depends upon the hypothesis tested. 44 Consider the
following hypothetical example: Did employer X practice age
discrimination when he hired 400 employees from 1000 applicants?
To test this hypothesis, the 1000 applicants are assigned a number
39. See note 6 supra.
40. See notes 87-120 and accompanying text infra.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970) (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
For the text of this section, see note 3 supra.
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 630-634 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (protects individuals between the
ages of forty and sixty-five years). The first appellate court to apply the Title VII
prima facie case standards to the ADEA was the Fifth Circuit. United States v. Hayes
Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 120 (5th Cir. 1972); Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
455 F.2d 818, 823 (5th Cir. 1972) (dictum).
43. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
44. D. HUNTSBERGER & P. BILLINGSLEY, ELEMENTS OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE
164-65 (3d ed. 1973).
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from 1 to 1000 and are subdivided into two groups. One group
consists of those individuals who are under forty or over sixty-five
years old and, therefore, unprotected by the ADEA. 45 The second
group includes all applicants who are between the ages of forty and
sixty-five, and thus entitled to protection against age discrimination
under the statute. 46 The ratio of applicants covered by the ADEA to
those not covered by the statute may then be compared to the ratio of
hired applicants covered by the ADEA to those not covered by the
statute. If the employer has not discriminated on the basis of age,
the proportion of covered individuals who applied for jobs will47be
similar to the proportion of covered individuals who were hired. If
age has been a factor in the employer's hiring practices, the
difference between the ratios will be greater than the slight deviation
48
that can be attributed to chance.

Statisticians can calculate the probability that the difference in
proportions will not exceed the difference that would be produced by
a random selection of the job applicants. 49 In the hypotheses stated
above, the disparity between the ratios would be statistically
significant at the .05 level if the probability were less than one
chance out of twenty that a random selection of job applicants would
produce a difference equivalent to the disparity. 50 Although the .01
level of significance is a more stringent standard, 5 1 it is conceptually
the same as the .05 level. A difference is statistically significant at
the .01 level if the probability were less than .01 that a random
52
procedure theoretically would produce a difference of that amount.
Thus, a "significant" difference is evidence of nonrandomness; in
other words, that factors other than chance - such as age - are at

work in the hypothesis.
Statistical significance must be distinguished from "legal
significance," which is the extent of statistical disparity that the
45. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. V 1975). Congress has recently proposed to extend the
coverage of the ADEA to those between the ages of 40 and 70. See H.R. 5383 § 2(a),
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); 123 CONG. REC. H17, 303 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1977); S. 1784,
§ 3(c), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), 123 CONG. REC. S17, 303 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. V 1975).
47. See J. SPENCE, B. UNDERWOOD, C. DUNCAN, & J. COTTON, ELEMENTARY
STATISTICS, 100-01 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as ELEMENTARY STATISTICS].
48. See Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 392 (2d Cir. 1973)
(racial and ethnic discrimination).
49. See ELEMENTARY STATISTICS, supra note 47, at 99-112.
50. See Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, supra note 6, at 398-99 n.49.
51. See ELEMENTARY STATISTICS, supra note 47, at 94. Theoretically, to rebut a
prima facie case of discrimination which is supported by valid statistical evidence,
significant at the .01 level, the defendant would also have to present evidence
significant at the .01 level. See Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, supra note 6, at 398
n.49.
52. ELEMENTARY STATISTICS, supra note 47, at 101-02.
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courts will consider to constitute a prima facie case. 53 Although the

concept of significance is essential to the implementation of
statistical analysis in discrimination cases, it has rarely been
addressed by the courts.5 4 Those cases which have addressed the
question have employed statistical theory as a guide for interpreting
the statistical data. 55 Courts have endorsed the position of professional statisticians who generally treat as significant those
deviations that can be expected to occur randomly no more than 5%
56
of the time - the .05 level of significance.
Although some statisticians have argued that the .05 level of
significance is completely arbitrary 5 7 and that the use of a higher .01 - or lower - .10 - level could be more meaningful in some
contexts,58 the use of the .05 level of significance in employment
discrimination cases seems appropriate for two major reasons. First,
the .05 level is generally used in all except the most rigid laboratory
experiments because most people consider the one-out-of-twenty
chance that a conclusion is wrong to be an acceptable degree of risk
unless special circumstances require a higher or lower degree of
certainty. 59 There is no obvious reason why this common sense
approach should not be adopted in employment litigation. The
second reason which supports the use of the .05 level is that the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission expressly adopts it as
the standard for examining the validity of the job relatedness of any
test used by an employer to screen employees. 60 Some courts have
53. See, e.g., United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 584 (10th Cir. 1977). See also text
accompanying note 68 infra.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 584 (10th Cir. 1977).
55. E.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430-31, 437 (1975).
56. Id.
57. E.g., Rozeboom, The Fallacy of the Null-Hypothesis Significance Test, in
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN STATISTICS 122 (B. Lieberman ed. 1971).
58. E.g., Eysenck, The Concept of Statistical Significance and the Controversy
about One-Tailed Tests, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN STATISTICS 212-13 (B.
Lieberman ed. 1971).
59. Rozeboom, supra note 57, at 118. Section 1607.5(c)(1) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedure (EEOC
Guidelines), 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(c)(1) (1976), sets forth one circumstance where a degree
of certainty higher than the .05 level of significance is required. Section 1607.5(c)(1)
provides:
(c) In assessing the utility of a test the following considerations will be
applicable:
(1) The relationship between the test and at least one relevant criterion
must be statistically significant. This ordinarily means that the relationship
should be sufficiently high as to have a probability of no more than 1 to 20 to
have occurred by chance. However, the use of a single test as the sole selection
device will be scrutinized closely when that test is valid against only one
component of job performance.
Id. (emphasis added).
60. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(c)(1) (1975). For the text of this section, see
note 59 supra.
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utilized the .05 level of significance in this context, but have viewed
it as "a desirable goal and not a prerequisite." 6' Given the judicial
precedent for using this level of significance to provide at least a
benchmark in evaluating employment practices, an inference of
discrimination should thereby be dispelled when the disparity
between the employer's work force and the general population of
applicants falls within the .05 level of significance.
In United States v. Test,62 one of the only discrimination cases
that addressed the concept of legal significance, the Tenth Circuit
ruled that legal and statistical significance are not necessarily
equivalent. 63 In that case, the defendants claimed that Colorado's
method of selecting potential members for federal grand and petit
juries violated the fifth and sixth amendments of the United States
Constitution 64 and the federal Jury Selection and Service Act of
1968,65 because the selection process resulted in substantial underrepresentation of chicanos, blacks, and persons under forty years of
age. 66 The disparities between the proportion of chicanos and blacks
in the general population and the voter registration lists from which
the juror lists were derived were not large, but the court found them
to be statistically significant. 67 Nevertheless, in the words of the
Tenth Circuit "[t]he mathematical conclusion that the disparity
between these two figures is 'statistically significant' does not,
however, require an a priori finding that these deviations are 'legally
significant'

.

"...,68 The

Tenth Circuit relied on Swain v. Ala-

bama,69 where the United States Supreme Court held that a claim of
systematic exclusion of blacks from juries was not established, even
though the defendant had shown that blacks comprised 26% of the
male population in the country, but only 10-15% of the jury
members. 70 In its consideration of Swain, the Test court noted:
In the present [case] the maximum disparity demonstrated by
defendants between the percentages of blacks and Chicanos in
the voting-age community and on the master jury rolls was
61. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 915 (5th Cir. 1973). The
Georgia Power court, in its discussion of § 1607.5(c)(1) of the EEOC Guidelines, noted
that the section's requirement of a .05 level of significance "must not be interpreted or
applied so rigidly as to cease functioning as a guide and become an absolute mandate
or proscription." Id. For the text of § 1607.5(c)(1), see note 59 supra.
62. 550 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1977).
63. Id. at 584.
64. U.S. CONST. amends, V, VI.
65. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1874 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

550 F.2d at 581.
Id. at 583-84.
Id. at 584.
380 U.S. 202 (1965); see 550 F.2d at 586-87.
380 U.S. at 205 (1965).
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approximately 4%. Since this figure is well below the 10-16%
range of disparity approved in Swain, the district court properly
concluded defendants had failed to establish a prima facie case
of systematic exclusion and accepted the government's general
7 1
explanations and asseverations of good faith in rebuttal.
Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit in Test did not specify the
degree of disparity that would be legally substantial. The case does,
however, provide a new ground for challenging a prima facie
employment discrimination case or rebutting a defense to such a
case, because the litigants can argue that a statistical analysis,
although significant to a statistician, is not necessarily significant
72
in a court of law.
III.

THE USE OF DATA IN APPLICANT FLOW AND DEMOGRAPHIC
ANALYSES

The two most common types of statistical analyses in Title VII
cases utilize what may be described as either applicant flow or
demographic data.7 3 Analyzing applicant flow data entails a
comparison of the applicant pool with hired employees, as demonstrated by the hypothetical example given in Section II. 7 4 In
contrast, the demographic method involves a comparison of
minority group representation in the employer's work force with that
of the general population in the geographical area.7 5 Through an
examination of cases that have considered demographic and
applicant flow data, it will be demonstrated that the selection of the
appropriate analytical method depends upon the facts of each case.
A.

Demographic Data Analysis

The demographic method of statistical analysis is intended to
reveal evidence of purposeful discrimination. Although Title VII

71. 550 F.2d at 587.
72. See id. at 584.
73. For a treatment of the demographic technique, see Statistics and Preferences,
supra note 6, at 468-72. For a discussion of applicant flow analysis, see B. SCHLEI &

P.

GROSSMAN,

supra note 18, at 1165-67.

74. See notes 44-50 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 121-133 and
accompanying text infra.
75. On many occasions, federal courts have compared the composition of the
company's work force with the composition of the labor force in the surrounding area.
See, e.g., Crockett v. Green, 534 F.2d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 1976); Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d
34, 40 (5th Cir. 1974); Erie Human Relations Comm'n v. Tuillo, 493 F.2d 371, 373 n.4
(3d Cir. 1974); Bridgeport Guardians v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333,
1335 (2d Cir. 1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972). See also note 79
infra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 23: p. 5

*does not require "an employer's work force to be racially balanced,"76 the use of demographic data to prove employment

discrimination

has been endorsed

by the Supreme Court. In

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.

United States,77 the

Supreme Court noted:
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative...
only because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful

discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be
expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time
result in a work force more or less representative of the racial
and ethnic composition of the population in the community from
which employees are hired. Evidence of longlasting and gross
disparity between the composition of a work force and that of
the general population thus may be significant even though...

Title VII imposes no requirement that a work force mirror the
7
general population.

8

The preliminary task in the use of demographic data is to
determine the appropriate "general population" to compare with the
employer's work force. 79 The relevant points of comparison may be

between the minority group representation among the employees
and the labor market in the surrounding city, county, or state. An
increasing number of jurisdictions have utilized Standard Metropoli-

tan Statistical Area (SMSA) data, which is taken from the national
census grouping in the area surrounding the employer's place of
business.80 After determining that SMSA data is relevant to the case,
76. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20
(1977). Section 7030) of Title VII provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any
employer . . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religion, sex or national origin of such individual or
group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total
number or percentage of persons of any race. . . or national origin employed by
any employer ... in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons
of such race . . .or national origin in any community, State, section, or other
area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or other
area.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
77. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
78. Id. at 339-40 n.20, citing United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416
F.2d 123, 127 n.7 (8th Cir. 1969).
79. Statistics and Preferences, supra note 6, at 469. Justice Stevens has written
that as a general rule, "[t]he relevant labor market area is that area from which the
employer draws its employees." Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct.
2736, 2745 n.2 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting), citing United States v. Ironworkers
Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 n.19 (9th Cir. 1971).
80. E.g., Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 272 (10th Cir. 1975). For a
discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 82-86 infra. See also note 29
supra.
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some appellate tribunals have criticized trial courts because the size
81
of the SMSA was inappropriate.
Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc.82 demonstrated that both the size
of the employer work force and the SMSA used in the statistical
analysis must be appropriately chosen. In that case, the plaintiffemployee brought an individual claim and a class action, alleging
that the defendant's hiring practices violated Title VII.83 In denying
the class action claim on the basis of a finding of no statistical
disparity, the Tenth Circuit ratified the district court's comparison of
the Denver SMSA data with the data collected from the Safeway
warehouse involved in the suit. 84 The circuit court reasoned:

The district court compared the percentage of blacks living in
the Denver Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, 4.1 percent,
with the number of blacks hired by Safeway at the frozen food
warehouse between 1968 and 1972, an average of 18 percent each
year .

. .

. Since the district court limited Taylor's class claim to

the frozen food warehouse [instead of Denver Safeway Stores
generally] its choice of data for comparison was proper ...
[W]e find no substantial statistical disparity in blacks employed
at the warehouse to prove a prima facie case of past discrimination by Safeway in its hiring at the frozen food warehouse.85
Thus, the court demonstrated that once the appropriate size of the
SMSA is chosen, it still must be compared to the relevant work force
- the frozen food warehouse, instead of all the Safeway stores in the
86
area.
In the choice of the relevant surrounding labor market for
demographic analyses, three types of problems have surfaced in the
case law: 1) some courts have mistakenly compared the employer's
work force to groups other than the local labor market;8 7 2) courts
have noted that statistics of the general population do not always
reflect the pool of qualified job applicants;8 8 and 3) some courts have
compared the representation of a single minority group on the
employer's staff with the total minority population in the surrounding area.8 9 While some courts have inadvertently overlooked these
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

E.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco, 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976).
524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 266; see note 29 supra.
524 F.2d at 272.
Id. (footnote and citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
See id.
See notes 90-95 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 96-114 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 115-117 and accompanying text infra.
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problems, others have provided rulings that should serve as a guide
in the future.
The first type of problem was exemplified in Hazelwood School
District v. United States,9° where the district court relied upon a
comparison of the percentage of black teachers in the school district
to the number of black pupils in the school. 91 The trial court held for
the school district, 92 and the Eighth Circuit reversed on the basis of
a sufficient statistical disparity in the record:
The district court erred in comparing the percentage of black
teachers in Hazelwood with the percentage of black students in
its schools rather than with the percentage of black teachers in
the relevant labor market area. The law is well-settled that the
relevant consideration in an employment discrimination case is
the statistical disparity between the proportion of blacks in the
employer's workforce and the proportion of blacks in the labor
market . . .. 93
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the case was
remanded to the trial court because the appellate court's finding of a
statistical disparity in the record denied the employer an opportunity
to rebut the prima facie case.9 4 The Supreme Court, however,
affirmed the Eighth Circuit's criticism of the type of comparison
admitted by the trial judge:
There can be no doubt . . . that the District Court's
comparison of Hazelwood's teacher work force to its student
population fundamentally misconceived the role of statistics in
employment discrimination cases. The Court of Appeals was
correct in the view that a proper comparison was between the
racial composition of Hazelwood's teaching staff and the racial
composition of the qualified95 public school teacher population in
the relevant labor market.

90. 97 S. Ct. 2736 (1977).
91. United States v. Hazelwood School Dist., 392 F. Supp. 1276, 1287 (E. D. Mo.
1975), rev'd, 534 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 2736 (1977).
92. 392 F. Supp. at 1286.
93. United States v. Hazelwood School Dist., 534 F.2d 805,812 (8th Cir. 1976). The
Eighth Circuit further commented: "The level of black student enrollment in
Hazelwood school sheds no light whatsoever upon the dispute before us, and the
district court clearly erred in absolving Hazelwood of unlawful employment practices
on the basis of the paucity of black students in the Hazelwood schools."
Id.
94. 97 S.Ct. at 273-74. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
95. Id. at 2742 (footnote and citation omitted).
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The second type of problem involving selection of the appropriate local work force is the comparison of qualified applicants for
skilled positions with the general work force population. In James v.
Stockham Valves and Fittings Co.,96 a district court properly
directed:
When considering the number of blacks in jobs /which
require special skills and abilities, the relevant figure for
comparison purposes is the percentage of blacks in the local
labor market who are qualified for such jobs. The relevant labor
pool cannot be assumed to be the same as the general population
where the jobs demand skills and training possessed by
97
relatively few individuals.
The Supreme Court of the United States was faced with a similar
issue in Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League,98
where Philadelphia civic leaders claimed that Mayor Tate violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by
discriminating against blacks in the appointment of the school
board nominating panel. 99 According to the City Charter, nine of the
thirteen panel members were to consist of "the highest ranking
officer of [each] one of nine categories of citywide organizations."'10 0
The district court held that "differences between the percentage of
Negroes in the city's population (34%) or in the student body of the
public school system (60%) and the percentages of Negroes on the
1971 Nominating Panel (15%) had no significance."' 0'1 The Third
Circuit reversed, finding racial discrimination by relying in part on
the percentage comparisons that had been rejected by the district
court.

0 2

96. 394 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Ala. 1975).
97. Id. at 496 (citations omitted).
98. 415 U.S. 605 (1974).
99. Id. at 609.
100. Id. at 607.
101. Educational Equality League v. Tate, 333 F. Supp. 1202, 1205-07 (E.D. Pa.
1971).
102. Educational Equality League v. Tate, 472 F.2d 612, 618 (3d Cir. 1973). In
finding a significant statistical disparity based on the data presented to the district
court, the Third Circuit stated:
[T]he small proportion of blacks on the Panel is significant in light of the racial
composition of the public schools, which are about 60% black. Because one
qualification for Panel membership is interest in the public school system and
because the parents of school children are likely to have this interest, a
colorblind method of selection might be expected to produce that many more
black Panel members. Thus, properly considered, the small proportion of blacks
on the Panel points toward the possibility of discrimination.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

15

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 2

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 23: p. 5

Citing two statistical principles which the appellate court had
neglected, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court that
there was no reliable proof of discrimination in the record. 10 3 The
Court initially noted that the percentage comparisons between the
racial composition of the panel and the city population failed to take
into account the high qualifications required of panel members.1o4
The Court stated, "the relevant universe for comparison purposes
consists of the highest ranking officers and the categories of
organizations and institutions specified in the city charter, not the
population at large." 0 5 Second, since the only panel had thirteen
members, and "the addition or subtraction of a single Negro meant
an 8% change in racial composition," 106 the Court concluded that the
universe was too small to produce statistically significant compari10 7
sons.
In a similar case, James v. Wallace, °s the Fifth Circuit also
rejected a demographic comparison. In that case, Governor George
C. Wallace was charged with systematically discriminating against
blacks in his appointments to state boards and commissions. 10 9 The
evidence showed that, although 23% of the state's citizens were
black, less than 1% of the Governor's appointees were black.110 The
court held that plaintiffs' demographic analysis had not made out a
prima facie case, finding that "not every black person in Alabama is
qualified to serve on the boards and commissions named in this
action. For many such bodies there are very specialized prerequisites
"111

Another example of demographic comparisons of qualified and
unqualified individuals is Patterson v. American Tobacco Co.112 The
defendant company in that case argued that the district court had
erroneously considered the number of blacks and women in the
Richmond SMSA general workforce, rather than using only the
blacks and women in the Richmond SMSA supervisory workforce, to

103. 415 U.S. at 620-21.
104. Id.
105. Id.; see text accompanying note 100 supra.
106. Id. at 611.
107. Id. Several courts have warned that statistical evidence must be disregarded
when it is derived from an extremely small universe. See Harper v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 412 (8th Cir. 1975); Cupples v. Transport Ins. Co., 371 F.

Supp. 146, 149 n.1 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 498 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1974); Pace College v.
Commission on Human Rights, 38 N.Y.2d 28, 339 N.E.2d 880, 377 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1975).
108. 533 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1976).
109. Id. at 964.

110. Id.
111. Id. at 967.
112. 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976).
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ascertain a ratio applicable to promotions. 11 3 The Fourth Circuit
agreed with the company and stated:
The record discloses that 6.8 percent of the blacks and 1.5
percent of the women in the Richmond SMSA are placed in a
category that includes supervisory personnel. Those percentages
furnish a more realistic measure of the company's conduct than
the gross percentage of blacks and women in the whole
workforce, including unskilled labor.114
The third type of error which is prominent in employment
discrimination cases is the comparison of statistics for a single
minority group with those for the entire minority population. In Rios
v. EnterpriseAssociation Steamfitters Local 638,115 the district court
had ordered the defendant steamfitters union to achieve a 30%
representation of black and Spanish surnamed individuals in the
union's apprenticeship program as a remedy for past discrimination.1 1 6 The Second Circuit held that the representation goal was
inaccurate noting that
[t]he trial judge's comments at one point during the proceedings
indicate that the [30%] figure was prompted by regulations
recently proposed by the Deputy Mayor-City Administrator of
the City of New York, which set a goal of 28% "minority"
steamfitters to be reached by June 30, 1977. However, this
proposed figure (which is not part of the record below) was based
on a definition of the term "minority" which includes not only
Negroes and Spanish sur-named Americans but Orientals,
American Indians and, where appropriate, females and other
classes of individuals which have been the subject of past
17
discriminatory practices.'
This
Alliance
minority
compare

type of problem was avoided in Kaplan v. International
of Theatrical Employees '18 by the selection of the proper
comparison group. In Kaplan, SMSA data was used to
female membership in the defendant-union to the female

113. Id. at 274. This objection was based on the district court's finding that the
American Tobacco Co. had engaged in sex and race discrimination in the selection of
supervisors. See id. at 272.
114. Id. at 275.
115. 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
116. United States v. Local 638, Enterprise Ass'n of Steam, 360 F. Supp. 979
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
117. 501 F.2d at 632.
118. 525 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1975).
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population of the relevant labor force. 11 9 In the words of the Ninth
Circuit:
Upon showing disproportionate female membership in a union

in comparison to the available female work force in a demographic area, an inference arises that the sex imbalance results

from discrimination, and the burden of going forward and the
burden of persuasion is shifted to the accused, for such a
showing is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of sex

discrimination. 120
The other method used for proving a prima facie case of
discrimination is the utilization of applicant flow data. 121 The
applicant flow analysis is simply a comparison of the proportion of
minority representation among the total applicants with the
minority representation among the successful applicants - the
employees. 1 22 In United States v. GeorgiaPower Co.,'2 3 evidence that
only 7.2% of the employer's workforce was black, while 33% of the
applicants for employment at some of defendant's plants were
125
black, 124 along with evidence of overtly discriminatory acts,
presented a prima facie case of racial discrimination in hiring.' 26 In
Johnson v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 127 the Fifth Circuit
compared the percentage of newly hired blacks placed in the lowest
job grade (40%) with the percentage of new employees generally who
were placed at that level (5%).128 Thus, 95% of the total applicants
119. Id. at 1358.
120. Id.
121. For a detailed analysis of applicant flow data, see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN
supra note 18, at 1165-67. See also text accompanying notes 44-50 & 74 supra.A third
method of analysis, "comparative" analysis, is related to the applicant flow method,
because it involves the use of statistics to compare the treatment of minority
employees of the company. Statistics and Preferences, supra note 6, at 468-72. For
applications of comparative analysis, see Bolton v. Murray Envelope Corp., 493 F.2d
191, 195 (5th Cir. 1974) (court relied on evidence that 34% of black employees had
janitorial positions, while less than 6% of white employees held such positions, and
that 100% of higher-paid printers and office workers were white to establish prima
facie employment discrimination case); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d
1038, 1040 (5th Cir. 1969) (court relied on evidence that 96% of white employees were
positioned in seven highest pay grades, while 77% of black employees held jobs at
three lowest pay grades to establish prima facie case).
122. See, e.g., Hester v. Southern Ry., 497 F.2d 1374, 1379 (5th Cir. 1974).
123. 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
124. Id. at 910 n.2.
125. Id. at 925-26. The Fifth Circuit concluded that word-of-mouth hiring practices
and a policy of recruiting skilled applicants only from all-white institutions had a
discriminatory effect on black employment. Id.
126. Id. at 910 n.2.
127. 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
128. Id. at 1369 n.4. This exemplifies the "comparative" statistical technique. See
note 121 supra.
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hired were placed into higher job grades, while only 60% of the
blacks hired were so placed. 129 This disparity was held by the district
court to constitute a prima facie case. 130
Although applicant flow analysis often provides stark percentage comparisons, it can be misleading. The district court in
Patterson v. Western Development Labs,1 3 1 considered evidence of
alleged discrimination in hiring based upon a pool of 5000
applications. 1 32 Concluding

that the

applicant pool had been

incorrectly drawn, the court rejected the data:
These

statistics on

actual applicants

. . . are incomplete,

because they were taken from data which included only the 5,000
applicants who applied "in person" at defendant's Palo Alto
facility - a group that generally applies for lower skilled
positions - and did not include the 8,000 additional applicants
who applied "by mail" - a group from which defendant hires by
far the greater number of its employees ...
It further appears from the evidence that plaintiffs, in
comparing the percentages of blacks who applied for employment to the percentage of blacks actually hired, compared the
percentage of black applicants only in the "in person" group
both
(11.1%) with the percentage of blacks actually hired from
133
the "in person" and the "by mail" applicants group.
There is controversy over whether applicant flow or demographic data provide the most reliable evidence.13 4 If the role of
statistics in civil rights litigation expands in the future, continued
conflict over this question can be anticipated. In Hester v. Southern
Railway Co.,135 the Fifth Circuit concluded that the applicant flow

analysis was superior: "The most direct route to proof of racial
discrimination in hiring is proof of disparity between the percentage
of blacks among those applying for a particular position and the
percentage of blacks among those hired for the position.' 36 The
same court, however, in Jones v. Tri-County Electric Cooperative,
Inc., 37 emphatically endorsed the demographic method of analysis,
129. See 491 F.2d at 1369.
130. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 349 F. Supp. 3, 13-15 (S. D. Tex.
1972). The district court's finding on this issue was not challenged on appeal to the

Fifth Circuit.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 772 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
Id. at 774.
Id. (emphasis in original).
See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 18, at 1165.
497 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1379.
512 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1975).
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noting that "[tihe statistics which the courts have always considered
is the racial composition of the employer's work force as compared to
the percentage of the minority population the employer's service
39
area."' 138 A district court, in Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp.,
carefully scrutinized the applicability of a demographic analysis in
general and stated:
The implication of present decision law is that if industry
employs blacks below the ratio of minority to majority in the
area work force it is prima facie evidence of discrimination. As
affecting the industry involved in this case, the evidence is that
the hourly employees meet the quota as established by this ratio.
However, the ratio of applicants more nearly approximates 5050, which is considerably higher than the ratio of minority to
majority in the work force, ergo, this industry discriminates.
This is so because these statistics, as in other cases, show a
prima facie case of discrimination and therefore the burden
shifts to the industry to prove that it has some justifiable
business purpose why the employment ratio ought not to be 5050. Advancing the same argument to its ultimate conclusion, you
can envision a situation where the number of applications were
maneuvered to or legitimately filed so as to reflect 100 percent
with the result [that] the industry employees would become all
black or nearly so. This is a strange anomaly. An industry could
never become all white without being discriminatory, but it
could become all black without being discriminatory - (at all
cost we must avoid situations that would require considerations
of questions of reverse discrimination). Another glaring anomaly is that if such a theory is accepted and followed, what occurs
when the ratio and applicants vary from day to day, week to
week and year to year? Industry would never know when it was
or was not in compliance, and can't you imagine the argument if
140
the application ratio fell below the area work force ratio!
The applicant flow and the demographic analysis are each
useful in a variety of specific fact situations.14 1 A recent development
will undoubtedly bolster the reliability of SMSA data in demographic analysis. On October 17, 1976, Congress mandated that a middecade census be undertaken in addition to the traditional decennial
census. 142 The updating of the population data through survey and

138. Id. at 2.

139.
140.
141.
142.

380 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Ala. 1974).
Id. at 736-37.
See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 18, at 1165-67, 1170-95.
Pub. L. No. 94-521, 90 Stat. 2459 (1976).
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statistical techniques will clearly upgrade the relevancy and
usefulness of SMSA data and, therefore, the demographic method of
analysis in civil rights litigation.
IV.

THE USE OF SOPHISTICATED STATISTICAL ANALYSES

The vast study of statistics offers litigants a variety of
analytical approaches for presenting and rebutting arguments in
discrimination suits. Two of the more sophisticated statistical
methods, multiple regression 14 3 and the chi-square test, 1" however,
by and large remain untapped. The technique of multiple regression,
which can determine the degree of influence that one variable - age
- has over another variable - salary - is easily adaptable to
defend against a prima facie case of discrimination. 45 Regression
analysis can best be explained by presenting an example of simple
linear regression, where there is only a single explanatory variable.1 46 The example is depicted by a graph with the characteristic to
be explained - salary - represented on the vertical axis and the
explaining factor - age - represented on the horizontal. Each
employee is illustrated by a point on the graph. Linear regression
estimates the line that is the closest to this conglomeration of
points.14 7 If the effect of factors not considered in the analysis (merit,
seniority, etc.) is negligible, the points will form a relatively straight
line. 148 If there are substantial unexplained influences, the points
will not line up. Regression analysis finds the line that best depicts
the relationship between the variables examined. 49 Multiple
regression is simply an extension of simple linear regression to the
use of several explanatory variables, each of which has a separate
axis.5°
In the context of an employment discrimination case, assume
that an employer is charged with giving discriminatory raises.
143. For a discussion of the use of multiple regression analysis and variance
analysis to prove employment discrimination cases, see Statistical Proof and
Rebuttal, supra note 6, at 395-405. According to the commentary, "[tihe term
,regression' is a carryover from the first use of this statistical method, Karl Pearson's
study of height of fathers and sons to prove the law of 'regression to the mean.'" Id.
at 395 n.35, quoting G. SNEDECOR & W. COCHRAN, STATISTICAL METHODS 164 (6th ed.
1967).
144. For a detailed discussion of the chi-square test, see N. DOWNIE & R. HEATH,
BASIC STATISTICAL METHODS ch. 14 (1959); A. HUGHES & D. GRAWOIG, STATISTICS: A
FOUNDATION FOR ANALYSIS ch. 11 (1971).
145. See Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, supra note 6, at 409-15.
146. Id. at 398 n.48.
147. Id.
148. See A. HUGHES & D. GRAWOIG supra note 144, at 316.
149. Id.
150. Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, supra note 6, at 398 n.48.
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Suppose each employee's last annual raise is the dependent variable
Y,' 5 1 and the following factors represent the independent
variables: age-X 1 , years of education-X 2, years of seniority in the
particular company-X 3 , and race-X 4 . A numerical value could be
assigned for each of the five variables for every employee. Since the
X 1,X 2,and X 3 ,variables are "continuous" i.e., they exist to different
degrees, they are directly quantifiable. However, the X 4 variablerace-is "binary"' 52 - i.e., there are only two race classifications in
the hypothetical. Numerical values for X 4 must be assigned by
membership in a group-O for nonwhite and 1 for white, or vice
versa.
The equation for this hypothetical would be of the form:

Y = bo + b1XI + b 2X 2 + b 3X 3 + b 4X 4
where bo is a constant; b, measures the marginal change in the
annual salary raise, Y, which is associated with an additional year
of age, all other things being equal; b 2 measures the change in Y
which is associated with an additional year of education, all other
things being equal; and b 3 measures the change in Y which
accompanies one additional year of seniority. The b 4 figure
represents the change in Y that is attributable to the fact that the
employee is white - a change in X4 from 0 to 1. If the defendant
company has not discriminated on the basis of race, b 4 will not differ
significantly from 0.
Regression analysis offers evidence in a relatively simple and
easily comprehensible format. It can be applied to charges of
153
discrimination at almost any stage of the employment process,
and an equation can easily be expanded to fit the data by adding
other independent variables. However, despite its appeal, a regres-

151. According to one commentator:
In order to use . . . [multiple regression analysis], the measurement of

the observed characteristic whose variance is to be explained must be in numeric
form. If the quantity actually being explained, for example salary, were available
only in the form of levels, such as three tiers (apprentice, journeyman, and
craftsman), quantitative analysis . . . would then be difficult.
Id. at 396 n.43, citing M. EZEKIEL & K. Fox, METHODS OF CORRELATION AND
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 378-87 (3d ed. 1959).
152. For a discussion of discrete (including binary) and continuous variables, see
A. HU9HES & D. GRAWOIG, supra note 144, at 42-43.
153. Statistical evidence can be applied to cases of discriminatory hiring,
promoting, or discharging of employees, in addition to certain inequitable work
conditions, such as salary differentials. For the most part, however, "[a]llegations of
discrimination in work conditions are not susceptible to proof by statistics ....
James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 394 F. Supp. 434, 456 (N.D. Ala. 1975). See
note 151 supra.
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sion analysis has been utilized in only one case. In Wade v.
54
Mississippi Cooperative Extension Service,1
the trial court relied
partially upon plaintiffs' regression analysis to hold that the
plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of discrimination in
hiring and promotion.15 5 In its brief to the Fifth Circuit, defendants
56
attempted to discredit the foundation of the regression analysis.
Relying on expert witness' testimony, defendants alleged that the
application of regression analysis to the field of social science
57
violated sound statistical procedures.
The Fifth Circuit rejected defendants' contentions on two
grounds. 5 8 First, it found that the district court had relied upon both
the regression analysis and evidence that although eighty-seven
vacancies existed, no black was ever promoted to such a position. 5 9
Secondly, the court held that the regression analysis was valid in
this context:
Although multi-variate regression analysis is indeed a sophisticated and difficult method of proof in an employment discrimination case, there was additional evidence of specific instances
of black and white workers with essentially similar experience
and qualifications receiving disparate salaries. Thus, we find
that while in some instances the statistical facts spoke for
themselves, as in the absence of promotions of black professional workers, in other cases, there was evidence beyond the
statistical facts and analysis that would support an inference of
60
discrimination, as in the case of salaries.
This use of a sophisticated analysis by litigants graphically
demonstrates the courts' hesitancy to deal with statistics. Instead of
squarely addressing multiple regression, the court "hung its hat" on
evidence with which it was more familiar - testimony of specific
instances of discrimination.' 61 In acknowledging the use of multiple
regression in a social statistics setting, however, the court implicitly
opened the door for its future use.
154. 372 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Miss. 1974); aff'd, 528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976).
155. 372 F. Supp. at 140.
156. Brief for Appellants at 13-24, Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Extension Serv., 528
F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976).
157. 528 F.2d at 517.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (footnote omitted).
161. Id. The Fifth Circuit has been the most consistent to rule that statistical proof
alone creates a presumption, or a prima facie case, of discrimination, without the need
to show evidence of specific acts of discrimination. See, e.g., Resendis v. Lee Way
Motor Freight, Inc., 505 F.2d 69, 70-71 (5th Cir. 1974); Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor
Freight Systems, Inc., 505 F.2d 40, 53 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd in part,431 U.S. 395 (1977);
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Another sophisticated statistical technique that has been
utilized by litigants is the chi-square test. 162 Chi-square is a test for
significance which utilizes contingency tables to determine whether
observed differences in any sample are greater than those which can
be expected on the basis of chance.1 63 Frequencies are first calculated
from the data with the aid of a standard contingency table on the
theory that the data are distributed in a particular curve by
chance. 6 4 If the distribution is nonrandom and an assignable cause
is involved, the resulting differences will be higher than the
165
differences that are likely to be observed in a random situation.
Then the values of the chi-square statistic can be analyzed to
166
ascertain whether or not there is a significant disparity.
Unlike the district court in Wade,' 67 the trial court in Chance v.
Board of Examiners'6s presented an in-depth analysis of the
litigants' use of the chi-square test based upon the testimony of
opposing statisticians.1 69 The plaintiffs alleged that examinations
prepared and administered by defendants for the licensing of
supervisory personnel had the effect of discriminating against
blacks and Puerto Ricans. 170 Plaintiffs' expert testified that the
sample was large, and thus formed a sound basis for drawing
statistical conclusions. 17' In analyzing the aggregate data by means
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 225 (5th Cir.), rehearingdenied
en banc, 494 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112,
120 (5th Cir. 1972); Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 822-23 (5th
Cir. 1972) (dictum in age discrimination case).
However, in other cases, the Fifth Circuit has qualified its broad ruling that
employment discrimination suits can be proved without evidence of an overt
discriminatory act. In the words of the court, "[slometimes statistical evidence alone
will suffice; on other occasions live testimony or additional exhibits may be
necessary." United States v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1053 (5th Cir.
1975), rehearing denied en banc, 525 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1976). Accord, United States
v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984
(1971). Both of these cases, however, may be distinguished because they were actions
brought by the Attorney General against a "pattern or practice" of discrimination,
pursuant to § 707 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1970). See note 13 supra.
162. See Chance v. Board of Examiners, 330 F. Supp. 203-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd.,
458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
163. N. DOWNIE & R. HEATH, supra note 144, at 147-49; ELEMENTARY STATISTICS,
supra note 47, at 195-96.
164. N. DOWNIE & R. HEATH, supra note 144, at 149.
165. A. HUGHES & D. GRAWOIG, supra note 144, at 236.
166. ELEMENTARY STATISTICS, supra note 47, at 197.
167. See notes 154-161 and accompanying text supra.
168. 330 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd., 485 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
169. 330 F. Supp. at 211.
170. Id. at 205.
171. Id. at 211. In the period in question, the evidence showed that the
examinations had been administered to 6,201 candidates for supervisory positions. Id.
at 210. Of the 6,201 candidates, 5,910 were identified by their race; thus, the sample
consisted of those 5,910 candidates. Id. The gross aggregate pass-fail statistics
revealed that the overall pass rate was 44.3% for white candidates and 31.4% for
nonwhite candidates. Id.
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of the chi-square test, the witness found that "the probability of the
difference being a chance result not related to the factor of race is
172
determined as less than one in one billion."

In rebuttal, defendants' statistician challenged the use of
aggregate data based upon the possibility of overlap - that the
same persons may have taken more than one examination. 173 The
court rejected the overlap argument for three reasons. First, it held
that although defendants had the data from which to adduce how
many overlaps existed, it failed to restructure the sample accordingly. 174 Second, the defendants' expert conceded that a random
overlap would not have substantially affected the probabilities; in
fact, he testified that even an overlap of 50% would not have
substantially affected the significance of the observed difference
between the white and nonwhite pass rates.'7 5 Third, testimony of
plaintiffs statistician revealed that the aggregate pass-fail rates
were too high to be a mere matter of chance, even if the probability
76
were reduced somewhat because of the overlap.'
The plaintiffs presented another sample which consisted of the
fifty examinations that formed the raw material for the aggregate
pass-fail data.' 77 The court criticized the sample because it was too
small:
41 of the 50 examinations were taken by only 83 (or 10.1%) of the
total number of Black and Puerto Rican candidates. Because of
the smallness of the sample in each instance the resulting
figures for each examination, when analyzed individually,
cannot be accorded much weight or significance for our
purposes. Although statisticians can analyze very small samples
through use of a method called the Fisher Exact Probability Test
in conjunction with the Chi-Square (Yates-corrected) Test, in our
opinion such a sample is less reliable than analyses based on
larger samples, even after making allowances for greater
margins of error in use of the small sample. Use of the small
sample involves more extrapolation and theory superimposed on
less fact. We prefer the greater fact content found in the larger
sample. For the reasons explained by.

.

.[the plaintiffs expert]

- principally the risk of spurious differences based on
insufficient evidence - we do not believe that meaningful
conclusions as to differences can be drawn from the meager data
178
derived from any one of these 41 examinations.
172. Id. at 212 (emphasis in original).

173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

177. Id.; see note 171 supra.
178. 330 F. Supp. at 212.
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It is submitted that the court's analysis failed to consider that in
probability theory, the size of a sample does not necessarily have an
impact on its reliability. By making a mathematical adjustment
involving the "degrees of freedom," which compensates for the
smallness of the sample, it will provide data that is equally reliable
179
to that from much larger samples.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's findings and
analysis.'8 0 The defendants argued that other reasons could be
inferred for the underrepresentation of blacks and Puerto Ricans in
the supervisory positions.18 ' While acknowledging the possibility of
these influences, 182 the court held that the district court's findings
83
were not clearly erroneous.
Thus, litigants can find support for the utilization of sophisticated statistical techniques presented to courts by expert witnesses.
Virtually scores of analyses are available to fit the specific data in
any employment situation. With the aid of a creative statistician and
computer programmer, no data in employment discrimination cases
is too complex for the application of statistical analysis.
V.

BETTER USE OF STATISTICS -

A

PRACTICAL APPLICATION

The question arises whether or not a judge, who is generally
skeptical of numbers and unfamiliar with the language of mathematics, will be receptive to this form of proof. As the following
hypothetical example illustrates, 8 4 it is possible to combine
sophisticated statistical techniques with the common sense realities
of the employment situation to produce a persuasive defense to
allegations of employment discrimination.
The hypothetical P. Miller Inc., an industrial employer, has
several satellite manufacturing plants throughout the United States.
Each plant is autonomous as to hiring and personnel policies. The
179. Mayo, Towards Strengthening the Contingency Table as a StatisticalMethod,
in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN STATISTICS 339 (B. Lieberman ed. 1971).
180. Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
181. Id. at 1173.
182. Id.
183. Id. The Second Circuit noted:
But the question before us is whether the trial judge on the record before him was
required to accept those inferences, and it is quite clear that he was not. In sum,
while not all of us might have made the same factual inferences of racially
discriminatory effect from the statistical evidence, both documentary and oral,
before the court, none of us can say with the firm conviction required that those
factual findings were mistaken.
Id., citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
184. The facts of this hypothetical are loosely based upon, and the statistics drawn
from, the court's findings in United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 925
(5th Cir. 1973). See notes 123-126 and accompanying text supra.
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Harper City plant (P. Miller - Harper City) has no formula for
hiring. Assume that it leaves the actual decision to the personnel
director, Sam Jones, who screens all completed applications after a
job opening has been advertised in the community. Following a
large recruitment of employees, charges of race discrimination in
hiring were filed by several black men against P. Miller-Harper City.
Suit was filed and plaintiffs presented statistics showing that only
7.2% of the employer's workforce was black despite the fact that 33%
185
of the applicants for employment were black.
In rebutting the prima facie case made out above, the employer
has two alternatives: Show that plaintiffs' data are wrong, or
indicate how it fails to reveal any significant statistical disparities
to the disadvantage of a minority group. This hypothetical example
will illustrate the first approach, with reliance on the second where
the data do not sufficiently prove the hypothesis.
Assume that P. Miller-Harper City was convinced that the
percentage of black applicants -

33% -

did not accurately reflect

the number of qualified applicants. A statistician was hired, and a
cell theory constructed which accounted for the testimony and input
of Sam Jones.
The basic premise of the application of a cell theory to the hiring
process is that the employment decision is subjective, but that it is
186
also based upon certain definable and nondiscriminatory criteria.
In many hiring situations two sets of criteria must be met before an
individual is hired. The first set is based upon employment data,
which is readily apparent on the face of the application and tends to
"self-disqualify" the applicant. Having discarded these individuals
from the available sample, Sam Jones would then apply the second
set of criteria - those qualifications that the applicant must possess
in order to be hired. The applicants who do not self-disqualify, but
who meet the hiring criteria, theoretically should be hired without
regard to any other variables such as race and sex. Each applicant
can be assigned to a particular statistical cell, and if a similar
distribution occurs within the cells, it may be assumed that there
8 7
was no discrimination in the hiring.

185. See 474 F.2d at 910 & n.2 (7.2% of company's employees were black, while 33%
of applicants at two plants were black).
186. Only with discrete categories may the data be grouped in a finite number of
separate cells. In the words of one author, "[e]xpected cell frequencies are computed
according to the rules of probability. If two random variables are statistically
independent, their joint probability is the product of the two marginal probabilities."
A. HUGHES & D. GRAWOIG, supra note 144, at 236. See also ELEMENTARY STATISTICS,
supra note 47, at 199.
187. A. HUGHES & D. GRAWOIG, supra note 144, at 236-37.
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The instant cell analysis is a three-way classification: 1) whether
hired or not hired, 2) race of applicant, and 3) whether the applicant
has certain employability characteristics. The resultant grid is 2 x 2
x r, where r is the number of applicant categories established by the
personnel director. Since there are four criteria which each applicant
must satisfy, there are sixteen possible categories of applicants.1 88
Thus, the contingency table is 2 x 2 x 16, resulting in sixty-four
mutually exclusive cells. If race were a factor in the employment
decision, number two in the three-way classification above would be
statistically independent from the other classifications in the
equation. There is the danger that the hypothesis might be rejected
for the wrong reason - not because race is a factor despite
equivalent qualifications, but because one race may in general be
better qualified, and thus, that a larger proportion of applicants of a
particular race might fall into the categories where a higher
proportion are hired, even though race is not explicitly considered by
the employer. In order to avoid this outcome, statistical techniques
can be applied to test for significant differences between proportions
within the cells where applicants have similar qualifications.1 89
The first step in constructing the cell model in this case would be
to meet with Sam Jones and ascertain the criteria he used to
evaluate the applicants.190 Jones, with the aid of counsel, arrived at
seven self-disqualification criteria: 191
1. Inability to contact - no mailing address or phone number
supplied.
2. Request for part-time or temporary (summer) only - P.
Miller-Harper City was recruiting only for full-time employees.
3. Salary requirement too high where presently employed.
4. Applied for specific job not available or never available at
the Harper City facility.
5. Job-related health problem.
6. Failure to sign application attesting to truth of the
information stated therein.
7. Subsequently withdrew application or accepted employment
elsewhere.
188. See Figure 1 infra. See also text accompanying note 192 infra. Since each
applicant must meet or fail to meet each of the four characteristics, the number of
possible applicant categories is 2 x 2 x 4 = 16. See A. HUGHES & D. GRAWoIG, supra
note 144, at 236.
189. See A. HUGHES & D. GRAWOIG, supra note 144, at 236.

190. The number of criteria should be as small as possible to limit the number of
cells, and thereby simplify the actual analysis. See id.

191. To be persuasive, the self-disqualification criteria should be supported and

justified by testimony from Sam Jones for each individual to prove that no
discrimination was practiced in this segment of the hiring process. See Statistical
Proof and Rebuttal, supra note 6, at 409-10.
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Jones then arrived at the four major criteria necessary for the hiring
of an applicant:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Availability for necessary shift.
Immediate availability.
Satisfactory recommendations.
Skills.192

It can now be demonstrated how Jones would have evaluated
each application. Those individuals who fell within the seven selfdisqualifying criteria were removed from the sample, with comments
noted for future testimony. The remaining applications were
evaluated in terms of a cell structure established by the statisti194
cian. 193 The grid on the following page was constructed:
The grid depicts sixty-four separate and distinct cells, and each
applicant can fall within only one of them. For example, if Jones
had an applicant who was black, available for the proper shift, with
good skills, and recommendations, but who was not hired because he
was not available to begin work for a month, he would fall within
cell number fifty-three. Or, if the applicant was white, possessed the
requisite skills, was immediately available, but did not want to work
on the night shift, and had bad recommendations, even though he
was hired, that individual would fall within cell number eleven.
All of the applications were evaluated by Jones in the same
fashion, and each was assigned a number. The remainder of the
analysis would be completed by the statistician, who would use a
computer program. The actual computations are not relevant here.
192. In defining the broad area of skills, he listed nine subtopics which he
considered when determining if an applicant possessed the requisite skills:
1. Previous experience in job exactly like or very similar to openings
available - dexterity and applicable transfer of skills.
2. Reason for leaving last employment - previous work record.
3. Length of time in previous position - stability.
4. Education attainment and proficiency - potential.
5. Adequate health for demands for job - physical abilities.
6. Law violations - criminal record.
7. Distance away from Harper City plant and competition for the availability of work in that area - turnover potential.
8. U.S. citzenship.
9. Previous addresses match work experience and number of moves - jobhopping and stability.
These nine subtopics served two purposes: to aid Jones in the important decision as to
whether or not an applicant possessed the requisite skills, and to serve as legally
defensible criteria if the complex area of skills were challenged in court.
193. The cell structure should be founded upon statistical techniques which can be
explained by expert testimony on the witness stand. See id. at 419 & n.152, construing
Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 339 n.21 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1070 (1974) (trial court ordered to admit testimony of econometrics expert).
194. The mathematical symbol for "not" is -.
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This hypothetical example is significant because it demonstrates
that a cell analysis can be constructed which will combine logic and
advanced statistics in a presentation that can easily be justified and
explained to a judge. Ultimately, it should be successful in
overturning a prima facie case of discrimination, because this
analysis is an objective evaluation which precludes the subjectivity
of personnel practices in which such characteristics as appearance,
sex, race, national origin, age, and religion, can play a major role.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Statistical analysis can be of substantial assistance in the proof
or rebuttal of alleged employment discrimination. Such analysis, if
used properly and creatively, can be synthesized for use in all phases
of litigation and can provide objective criteria by which the court
can evaluate the effects of certain employment practices. Litigators
should work with statisticians to develop relevant statistical
analyses founded upon sound methodology and legal logic so that
courts will be better prepared to analyze data through the use of
statistical tools.
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